“Justified-Agenda-Belief” — Situated Ignorance

Epistemology

It’s easy to assume that most people value knowledge more than ignorance1. But, what if an individual or group saw utility (or even virtue2) in ignorance, and were motivated to construct it? This might be done with awareness and rationality. It could also be done intuitively and spontaneously. Such ignorance might be re-labeled as a “better truth”, a “deeper understanding”, or “healthy skepticism”. In this short-paper, my goal3 is to examine ignorance with a focus on (1) ignorance of the external world, not self-knowledge nor moral values and (2) agnotology, not agnoiology4.

Donna Haraway, Lorraine Code, and Maureen Ford explored various aspects of situated knowledge, which they considered both local and limited. Possible constraining boundaries on knowledge could include gender, family, culture, ethics, opportunities, education, wealth, mental health, physical abilities, personal history, traumatic experiences, etc. Given the variety of human experiences, knowledge is at least somewhat embodied (viewed from somewhere5), biased and situated. But, arriving at the truth is still the ultimate goal.6 So, when we examine situated knowledge, the Justified-True-Belief (JTB) model7 can be highly useful.

However, what if we agree with Karl Popper and assume that true ignorance is not the absence of knowledge, but the refusal to acquire it? Assuming there is a reason for this refusal, let’s call the refusal an “agenda”. I assert that ignorance does not put Truth at the center of its epistemic model, but instead substitutes truth with an agenda (i.e.; Justified-Agenda-Belief). Confidence8 in the agenda is critical to the ignorance model. The agenda then becomes the constraining boundary which localizes and defines the ignorance.

Before digging further into the nature of ignorance, I want to propose a motivation for the replacement of truth with an agenda. Given that an agenda is adopted by an individual, I define situated utilitarianism as, “maximizing the good of the individual”. In this viewpoint, the good of everyone is not equal. The good of the individual counts more than the good of anyone and everyone else. In this context, an agenda serves to attract initial interest from an individual and builds long-term attention on its tangible utility. This gives ignorance a power that rivals the power of knowledge.

SITUATED IGNORANCE

With the preceding introduction as a backdrop, it’s time to articulate my Justified-Agenda-Belief (JAB) theory of situated ignorance. Let’s make the following definitions, with some examples: (WARNING… controversy follows, and I am not advocating any positions by listing these topics)

  • An agenda is doing something to change current circumstances. Some examples include:
    • Agenda A1: Oppose mandatory child vaccinations.
    • Agenda A2: Make America Great Again (MAGA).
  • The utility of an agenda is the accrued benefits to an individual. Some examples include:
    • A1 has Utility U1: avoiding vaccinations can prevent children from acquiring autism.
    • A2 has Utility U2: MAGA increases prosperity and patriotism for American citizens.
  • Proposition “P” supports A if P is relevant and consistent with A. Some examples include:
    • A1 is supported by Proposition P1: the side effects of vaccines are more extensive than what physicians are telling parents.
    • A2 is supported by…Proposition P2: closing America’s borders reduces crime, saves money on welfare and increases job opportunities for Americans.
  • Effectiveness is how well an individual assesses that P supports A. Some examples include:
    • The effectiveness of P1: Doctors are paid a lot of money by the pharmaceutical companies so physicians can’t be trusted to tell the whole truth.
    • The effectiveness of P2: Drug-cartels, unemployment and low wages are a huge problem in US States that border Mexico, so immigration and welfare services to illegal aliens should be stopped.
  • Rightness R is the accuracy of how well P corresponds to the way the world actually is.

My situated ignorance theory is:

  • Subject S places more value on Effectiveness > Rightness.
  • Subject S normatively justifies Proposition P, if the basis for their justification is the evidence in favor of P, that Group G has told them is reliable.
  • Subject S normatively believes Proposition P, if the basis for their belief is the trust they have in Group G, which endorses P.

From the previous statements, I assert that Subject S is situationally ignorant with regards to Agenda A, if:

  • S decides that A has Utility.
  • S decides that the Propositions in support of A are Effective.
  • S normatively justifies Propositions in support A.
  • S normatively believes Propositions in support A.

Now, let’s review various characteristics of my Justified-Agenda-Belief theory:

  • Is situated ignorance rational? … NARROWLY
    • Since the validity of truth is replaced by the utility of agenda, innate knowledge and innate concepts become indispensable to situated ignorance. The anti-vaxxer innately “knows” that doctors are biased towards making money rather than helping people. MAGA supporters innately “know” they should be suspicious of strangers and foreigners. These things do not need to be proved, they are considered obvious. Because of its reliance on innate knowledge, situated ignorance claims to be consistent with both rationalism and foundationalism.
  • Is situated ignorance empirical? … NARROWLY
    • Justification and belief are normative and conforming to “group-think”. The observations made by the group (and the group leaders) are biased by their subjective perspective. For example, rational arguments about public health and scientific evidence are easily dismissed when they conflict with the experiences of anti-vax “influencers”. Likewise, labeling counter-arguments as “fake news” is used to eliminate observations that don’t support the group’s agenda. Situated ignorance is based on a restrictive form of empiricism that relies on strict boundaries between my truth, your truth, our truth, and their truth. The person upholding the agenda would say that observations must first be filtered, sifted and contextualized before the “real” truth can be understood.
  • Is situated ignorance pragmatic? … NARROWLY
    • The crux of situated ignorance is the self-serving utility of the agenda. Unlike “a claim is true if it is useful”, the preferred statement is “a claim is true if it is useful to ME”. An agenda that provides utility to someone else but not to me, would be considered at best irrelevant or at worst untrue. Situated ignorance is highly pragmatic to me and my group, but it doesn’t have to be useful universally nor even broadly.
  • Is situated ignorance powerful? … YES9
    • Using Steven Luke’s “three faces of power”10, situated ignorance has the power to affect decision-making (e.g., governance choices), non-decision-making (e.g., individual priorities), as well as ideology (e.g., personal worldview). Applying Michel Foucault’s view of power/knowledge, situated ignorance can be seen as a system of power that is upheld by an agenda accepted as “truth”, where the utility and agenda are in a mutually dependent relationship. In addition, situated ignorance wields power proportional to the size of its constituency (i.e.; a mob).
  • Is situated ignorance dangerous? .. YES
    • Dietrich Bonhoeffer wrote11, “Against stupidity we are defenseless”. I don’t claim that situated ignorance is stupid, far from it. But, trying factual persuasion is senseless and ineffectual. When attempting to refute situational ignorance, the problem is not intellectual, but sociological. In the face of compelling utility bestowed on the members of a group, the individual loses their independence and abdicates their autonomous position. In a discussion with a person who ignorantly supports an agenda, it’s not a logical dialogue consisting of premises and conclusions, but instead it’s a flurry of slogans and catchphrases.

CONCLUSIONS

My definition of situated ignorance is not a harmless gap in knowledge that hasn’t been filled yet12. In my theory of situated ignorance, the epistemic goal of seeking truth is replaced by seeking utility. The source of this utility (albeit limited and personal) must derive from something, and I call it, “the agenda”. By replacing truth with an agenda, situational ignorance places itself squarely in the realm of pseudo-philosophy13.

The agenda is not objectively important. The agenda is merely a tool to organize the ignorance. Supporting the agenda requires some justification and belief, but the situated nature of ignorance helps to greatly simplify the argument. The truth of a premise is irrelevant. A premise has credence solely based on its effectiveness in supporting the agenda.

Importantly, the shift in focus on utility rather than truth implies intent and agency. Situated ignorance is a concerted attempt to reshape reality into the agenda (what people want reality to be). Regardless of what reality “is”, situated ignorance introduces an ethical judgment on how it “ought” to be. From this, it could be argued that situational ignorance isn’t an epistemic topic at all, but more appropriately an ethical discussion.

Knowledge derives value from successfully matching the way reality actually is. The implication is that this value will result in the greatest good for the most people. Situated ignorance differs significantly from this ideal, by being self-serving to the individual and the group that upholds it. Removing the subjective utility of an agenda, creates an opportunity for truth to be reintroduced.

Social forces are constantly at work to craft situated ignorance, which undermines any objective justification. Instead, situated ignorance can be seen as an intellectual “raft”14 that is tossed around by ever-changing, cultural norms. Changes in the culture produces different agendas. However, popular agendas can change the culture. In this way, situated ignorance can overcome/overwhelm knowledge (over a long period of time) by eating away at its foundations. So, culture and agenda are lashed together like two planks on the raft of situated ignorance.

Knowledge from knowledge. Ignorance from ignorance. Utility from both.

Footnotes

1Friedrich August von Hayek claimed that knowledge and ignorance are weirdly interchangeable and possibly convertible. In regards to utility, this seems likely.

2Socrates went so far as to say virtue IS knowledge.

3My motivation is similar to Thomas Pynchon when he wrote: “We are often unaware of the scope and structure of our ignorance. Ignorance is not just a blank space on a person’s mental map. It has contours and coherence, and for all I know rules of operation as well. So as a corollary to writing about what we know, maybe we should add getting familiar with our ignorance, and the possibilities therein for ruining a good story.” (Slow Learner, Early Stories, 1984)

4I am using the definitions: (1) agnotology is the study of culturally-induced ignorance or doubt, and (2) agnoiology is the study of things which cannot be known. My appreciation to Robert Proctor for his work: “Agnotology: A Missing Term to Describe the Cultural Production of Ignorance (and Its Study)”, (2008).

5Thomas Nagel asserts that humans have the ability to look at the cosmos from a vantage point that is “nowhere in particular” (i.e.; objective perspective). While I agree with Nagel ontologically, I disagree pragmatically.

6In other words, situated knowledge remains consistent with accuracy-first epistemology, where accuracy is the only epistemic good.

7A subject S knows that a proposition P is true if and only if: P is true, and. S believes that P is true, and. S is justified in believing that P is true.

8The quality of seeming or being felt to be true, even if not necessarily true.

9In a similar way that “Knowledge itself is power” (Francis Bacon).

10“Power: A Radical View”, London: Macmillan, 1974.

11“After Ten Years” contained in LETTERS AND PAPERS FROM PRISON, 1942.

12The General Standard View (GSV) of ignorance requires that truth exists (either of a fact, object or procedure), so that ignorance can be defined as the absence of knowledge (e.g. non-knowledge).

13Nicholas Rescher, in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, defines psuedo-philosophy as deliberations that masquerade as philosophical but are inept, incompetent, deficient in intellectual seriousness, and reflective of an insufficient commitment to the pursuit of truth.

14Otto Neurath wrote in Empiricism and Sociology: Anti-Spengler (1921), “We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are never able to start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is taken away a new one must at once be put there, and for this the rest of the ship is used as support.”