I assert that certain types of beings have intrinsic value. But, in order to assign value, I must relate the ethics of “being”-ness to the metaphysics of “being”-ness. To facilitate this, I will define relevant being-types, value-laden properties and intrinsic qualifications.
Firstly, “Which being-types are to be examined”? I am including only those being-types that have concrete existence in the actual-world, which share common characteristics, regardless of individual identity. These being-types each have their own differentiated unity. The being-types that I am focused on are:
- Persons: I define a person to be a conscious type of being which demonstrates abstract reasoning about their subjective existence in the past, present and future objective world. Having thoughts and personal identity are essential to being a person. I am aligning myself closely with John Locke’s view of consciousness. I also subscribe to the ideas of Peter Carruthers where he argues phenomenal consciousness requires the capacity to think about, and therefore conceptualize, one’s own thoughts. Like G.W. Leibniz, I believe in many degrees of consciousness. I do not agree with Thomas Nagel’s definition of consciousness as experiencing some subjective way the world seems or appears from a particular point of view. Viewed as “passive” perception, Nagel’s definition falls short of the “active” creativity of consciousness. Thus, my view of Nagel’s definition is a more appropriate component of sentience. By my definition of what it means to “be a person”, I believe only humans possess consciousness.
- Agents: I define an agent to be a sentient type of being which produces mental states (i.e.; beliefs, desires, emotions, intentions, memories, pain, pleasure, and perceptions). Agents utilize cognition to perceive and interact with their environments. A hypothetical “brain in a vat” would qualify as an agent even though it is not interacting with the physical world around it. By my definition of what it means to “be an agent”, I would classify octopuses, dogs, and ravens as agents.1
- Creatures: I define a creature to be a biological type of being which exhibits phenomena associated with aliveness2. The state or condition of aliveness requires the capacity to engage in and perform vital activities. The specific activities of aliveness vary based on the biological nature of each organism. By my definition of what it means to “be a creature”, I would classify clams, insects, and trees as creatures.
Secondly, “What properties are considered value-laden?” I am including only those properties where it is intuitively understood that their presence is better than their absence. The value-laden properties that I am focused on are:
- Having Narration: I define “Narration” as the internal story I build within myself about what it’s like to be individually me. This story supervenes on the unique collection of personal qualia obtained by introspectively accessing the phenomenal aspects of my mental life. I assert that there is value in the survival of a being’s own story.
- Having Authenticity: I define “Authenticity” to be the expression of my unique origin and authorship that I exercise over my behavior. An example is demonstrated when a newborn behaves very early in their lives, before accumulating experiences. I assert that there is value in the survival of a being’s own authenticity.
- Having Distinction: I define “Distinction” to be the set of inherent characteristics of a being that distinguishes it’s self from others. This can be termed “uniqueness”, but does not imply numerical identity. I assert that there is value in the survival of a being’s own distinction.
Thirdly, “How does a value-laden property qualify as intrinsic?” I am including qualifications which I believe ensure that the property cannot be changed3 short of destroying the being itself. I am also applying these qualifications from the point of view of the universe. The qualifications that I am focused on are:
- Perdurant – a property must persist across time, in order for it to be intrinsic.4 Like Trenton Merricks, I believe that identity as a property over time is necessary for what matters in survival. As such, I disagree that identity as a property persists by enduring.
- Agnostic – a property must be present across all particular entities for the being-type under consideration, in order for that property to be intrinsic.
- Supervenient – a property must supervene on “being the being” itself, in order for that property to be intrinsic.
- Underived – a property must not be obtainable from anything outside the being itself, in order for that property to be intrinsic.
EXAMPLE 1: A Clam with Distinction
Clams have a very simple nervous system that is distributed throughout their body as a system of ganglia. This system allows clams to react to environmental stimuli. For example, some clams live alone, while others have a symbiotic relationship with small, plant-like organisms that use sunlight to make food for the clam. This doesn’t require thoughts or decisions. Each clam is simply responding autonomically to their specific external environment in ways that are beneficial to each individual’s continued existence. Giant clams, for example, close their shells when they detect a shadow overhead. This biological response can protect them from predation. We can see the Distinction in each clam as they interact with their particular external environment in an effort to survive and prosper.
Additionally, adult clams start out as planktonic larvae, then grow into free-swimming trochophore larvae, then veliger larvae, then pediveliger larvae. Soon after this last stage of development, the clam larvae lose their swimming organs and develop siphons, which are used for respiration and feeding. The life-cycle of birth→growth→death of any particular clam can be observed and measured distinctly.
From their lifelong response to environmental stimuli and process of growth, I assert that every clam (and every creature) has Distinction which is perdurant, agnostic, supervenient, and underived. The animacy of every creature differentiates each individual from all other beings of the same or different type. Therefore, I assert that clams are beings with intrinsic value due to their having the property of Distinction.
EXAMPLE 2: An Octopus with Authenticity
In the late-1980’s, Roland Anderson (a marine biologist at the Seattle Acquarium) began naming and classifying the Giant Pacific Octopus (G.P.O.) adults they had in captivity. This was because they couldn’t help noticing the animals’ distinct temperaments.
“Emily Dickinson, for example, a particularly shy, retiring female G.P.O. who always hid behind the tank’s rock outcroppings, or Leisure Suit Larry, who, Anderson told me, would have been arrested in our world for sexual assault, with his arms always crawling all over passing researchers. And then there was Lucretia McEvil. She repeatedly tore her tank apart at night, scraping up all the rocks at the base, pulling up the water filter, biting through nylon cables, all the parts left floating on the surface when Anderson arrived in the morning. One particularly temperamental G.P.O. so disliked having his tank cleaned, he would keep grabbing the cleaning tools, trying to pull them into the tank, his skin going a bright red.”5
Temperament can be defined as a characteristic way of reacting to the world, and it consists of emotional dispositions, responses and their speed and intensity. It’s important to note that temperament is not influenced by experiences. Personality includes temperament, but it is much more.
From their individual temperament, I assert that every octopus (and every agent) has authenticity which is perdurant, agnostic, supervenient, and underived. The sentience of every agent produces the mental states entailed in their own authenticity. Therefore, I assert that octopuses are beings with intrinsic value due to their having the property of authenticity. Since an octopus is not just an agent, but also a creature, it accrues the corresponding additional intrinsic value.
EXAMPLE 3: A Teenager with Narration
Consciousness builds a person’s narration from an on-going, internal conversation that results from the process of interiority. The features that make you the person you are, are those that are included in your own narration. For example, teenagers are constantly revising and editing the ways in which they talk about themselves in the past and the future. This is how they make sense of themselves and the world. According to Dan McAdams6,
“… beginning in adolescence, people start to become historians of the self. People begin to see their past as something that they can make meaning out of, and reconstruct it in a way that helps them understand where they may be going in the future.”7
The collection of personal qualia gleaned from interiority is the source of every human’s narration. I assert that to be a person, every human must have narration which is perdurant, agnostic, supervenient, and underived. The consciousness of every human demonstrates the abstract reasoning entailed in Narration. Therefore, I assert that humans are beings with intrinsic value due to their having the property of narration. Since a human is not just a person, but also an agent and a creature, they accrue the corresponding additional intrinsic values.
Concluding Remarks
Creatures exhibit the phenomena of aliveness which is a differentiator between self and others. Therefore, creatures have distinction which is perdurant, agnostic, supervenient and underived which creatures possess if they continue to exhibit the phenomena of aliveness. Therefore, the intrinsic value of creatures is grounded in their own distinction.
The property of authenticity is grounded in being able to produce mental states. Agents have authenticity which is perdurant, agnostic, supervenient and underived as long as they continue to produce mental states. Since being an agent also entails being a creature, the intrinsic value of agents is grounded in both their authenticity and distinction.
Persons demonstrate abstract reasoning which produces a collection of personal qualia. Personal qualia constitutes narration which is perdurant, agnostic, supervenient and underived which persons possess as long as they continue to demonstrate abstract reasoning. Since being a person entails being an agent, the intrinsic value of persons is grounded in their narration, authenticity and distinction.
I don’t equate the same value to all three being-types. But, my conclusion is that conscious, sentient and biological entities all have some amount of intrinsic value.
Footnotes
1. I would not qualify Artificial Intelligence as an agent because it cannot initiate it’s own actions. AI is always responding, but never creating.
2. The definition of “alive” has changed over the centuries as science accumulates more precise ways of measuring the line that distinguishes it from death. For example, the “permanent functional death of the brain stem” is currently the accepted criterion for cessation of aliveness in the United Kingdom.
3. As opposed to what Peter Geach calls a ‘mere Cambridge’ change in an object’s relational properties.
4. David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, ), “Something perdures if and only if it persists by having different temporal parts, or stages, at different times, though no one part of it is wholly present at more than one time.” Perdurance corresponds to the way a play is extended in time: Act I is not present when Act II is.
5. “The Animal Self” by Charles Siebert (January 22, 2006) published in the New York Times Magazine.
6. Dan P. McAdams (born February 7, 1954) is an American psychologist and the Henry Wade Rogers Professor in the Department of Psychology at Northwestern University.
7. “The stories we tell about ourselves: understanding our personal narratives with psychologist Dan McAdams” written by Antonia Mufarech, January 25, 2022 (published by https://northbynorthwestern.com/)